First and foremost, were the two long cherished notions: (1) , that nuclear facilities were designed, constructed and operated with such integrity, the chances of a serious accident occurring were extremely remote; and (2) , that even if an accident were to happen, because of the integrity of design, construction and operation, any accident would have little effect in terms of offsite radiological consequences.
Although the record of nuclear power safety is excellent in general terms, it is not flawless and we have been given some serious warnings.
The first of these two notions, that is "chances" or "probabilities" of accidents happening, has, in my view and the views of others, been essentially "knocked into a cocked-hat." Two relatively serious events, in terms of "chance", have occurred in large power reactor facilities in this country within the last four years: the serious fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear power facility and the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power facility.
The corrolary or second of these two notions, that is that little would happen in terms of offsite consequences, is to some measure still supported by the integrity of the facilities themselves. One cannot say too much with respect to the role and actions of operators and nuclear facility management during both of these events, except to say that tardy notification of offsite organizations occurred, some correct moves were made, but at the same time, many incorrect moves were also made. The point to be made here is that we were all very fortunate in both of these accidents in that offsite radiological consequences were either nonexistent or relatively minimal.
There may be those in industry and within the Federal government who do not share these observations, but nevertheless, it is my view, shared by many, that we came uncomfortably close in both of these accidents to potential consequences that could have caused grievous harm to individuals, our society, our environment, and oudW national energy program.
The warning has clearly manifested itself. Dr. Stephen Hanauer, of the NRC, who was the Chairman of the NRC Special Review Group (of which I was a member), which prepared the report (NUREG-0050)1 concerning the fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear power facility, remarked at one point during that investigation, with words to the effect --"Maybe it was like a mild heart attack --it woke us up". We have had a second "mild heart attack" at Three Mile Island. So, it behooves all of us, industry, government and everyone else involved, to learn from this experience because we may not get another chance to The "bottom line" on this Task Force report is, that there is no specific nuclear power plant accident that one can identify as being the accident for which plans and preparedness programs should be in place. Rather, the Task Force came down on the side of planning for consequences, with only minimal concern for the uncertainties of probabilities. And, to define an adequate, improved planning basis, the Task This need for a capability to accommodate emergency situations beyond the so-called "design basis accidents" used in plant and site evaluation, makes generic rather than site specific areas appropriate. The Task Force decided that the establishment of Emergency Plan- ning Zones (EPZs) of about 10 miles for the airborne "plume" radiological exposure pathway, and about 50 miles for the ingestion or food radiological exposure pathway would be sufficient to define the areas in which planning for the initiation of predetermined protective measures is warranted for any given nuclear power plant.
The Emergency Planning Zone concept is illustrated in Figure 1 .
As a side note and independent of the work of the NRC/EPA Task Force, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Nuclear Safety Division, was developing an Emergency Planning Zone concept very similar to the zones recommended by the NRC/EPA Task Force. The Swiss have three zones; an inner "Fast Alarm Zone" of 2 to 6 kilometers, a second zone of 20 kilometers (12.5 miles), and a third zone (for the ingestion pathway) with no radius prescribed.
Although not without some initial controversy and resistance from many quarters, the Task Force report is a major milestone along the way toward defining an adequate radiological emergency response planning basis. The report, and the recommendations contained in the report have been formally endorsed by the Commissioners of the NRC as of October 5, 1979 , and are also endorsed by the EPA Administrator as well. Any perceived problems in implementing the establishment of the Emergency Planning Zones can and will be overcome if there is a will and commitment to do so, at Federal, State and local government levels. exercise-scenario that resulted in significant offsite consequences. These hang-ups are now vanishing, post-TMI. The NRC is developing exercise-scenarios to realistically test onsite and offsite emergency plans which should result in improving the emergency response capability at all levels of government. 4 . Funding. Adequate funding for general and radiological emergency response planning and preparedness has been a problem at all levels of government, Federal, State and local. The funding problem is particularly acute at the local government level, where often many of the involved personnel are low-paid employees, part-time employees, or volunteers with meager resources available to them. Federal programs for general emergency planning and preparedness, that have been provided in the past, have not been entirely successful for a variety of reasons. Emergency planning and preparedness budgets are low, both at the Federal level, and at the State and local government levels, not only in terms of actual funding available but also in terms of priority assigned when related to other programs. Adequate salaries must be paid to Emergency Services people in order to attract good, competent candidates for these jobs.
The funding situation needs to be improved. The amount of money required for a substantial improvement in the radiological emergency planning and preparedness effort, (as a sub-set of general emergency planning and preparedness), does not appear to be staggering. As a matter of fact, it is very small when compared to the investment made in a single nuclear power unit, of say, 1000 Megawatts-Electric, the gross cost of which today is well over the one billion dollar mark, in today's dollars, and we have some 70 nuclear power facilities licensed to operate in this nation today, and many more under construction.
Where can these funds come from --and more importantly --where should they come from? But, in those communities with little available to them to improve matters, the recognition of a need to do more does not always translate to, or result in, improvement. Help is needed. And, although the Federal government can and should provide some assistance, the nuclear industry has an obligation to provide financial assistance as well. Some nuclear utilities have voluntarily done yeoman's work in this area, but many have 921 not done all they can and should do. It is in their best interests to do so. The need for these specialized emergency plans and the attendant preparedness that they imply, would be unnecessary if the nuclear facility were not there.
Dr. Salomon's report, "Beyond Defense-in-Depth" NUREG-0553, will be published as a final NRC staff report at the end of October, 1979. His report is not touted as the "be all and end all" of the emergency planning funding problem, but it is an excellent first glimpse of it and should serve as a basis for taking some action now and looking at the problem seriously, and developing a comprehensive solution in the very near future. The report should be useful to not only those of us involved in the regulation and management of the nuclear industry, but to the new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Congress of the United States. 
SUMMARY
The last bastion of the often touted and quoted "Defense-in-Depth" concept against consequences of accidents at nuclear facilities, which has governed the development of commercial nuclear power for two-andone-half decades in this country, is a proper and effective emergency planning and preparedness program with respect to these facilities. This bastion has not received the support which it deserves. Proper and adequate emergency planning, rather than paying "lipservice" to it, can help alleviate many of the fears surrounding the safe operation of nuclear power facilities. In the past, the old view that emergency planning and preparedness should be "kept in the closet," away from public scrutiny, lest it "stir-up the folks in Toonerville," just won't wash anymore. Three Mile Island has changed all of that, and I look at it as a healthy, up-beat change. This accident has given us a golden opportunity to improve things and we must not fail, collectively, to take advantage of it and to learn from it and to act on it. We are unlikely to have another chance to do so.
This means an augmented commitment of dedicated, competent people, modest money and resources, but it is a relatively small commitment in order to do the job properly. And, if this nation is to have its faith restored in this technology, an adequate, competent, high visibility emergency planning and preparedness program can, among other needed improvements, help achieve this goal. The choice is ours --collectively. 
